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34Abstract
The Code of Conduct for business taxation may, diametrically opposed to its intention, aggravate
tax competition between EU Member States. The reason is that it induces, by restricting harmful
tax practices, cuts in generic tax rates that may reduce tax revenue even further. If one
presupposes a benevolent utility maximising government, then this worsens the underprovision
of public goods. We show within a standard tax competition framework that this scenario is more
likely to unfold with a higher upper bound for nondistortionary taxes, a higher responsiveness of
mobile capital to tax rate differentials, and a smaller endowment of internationally mobile capital.
561 Introduction
Tax authorities of EU Member States bid against each other in an attempt to attract
internationally footloose business activity. They design tax measures that often conspicuously
favor certain types of highly mobile capital. Many believe that these measures are the upshot for
a tax race to the bottom that erodes public good provision. Indeed, the threat of such a race has
prompted the European Union to adopt a Code of Conduct for business taxation (Council of the
European Communities, 1998). It denes harmful tax practices as measures that: (1) affect, or
may affect, in a signicant way the location of business activity in the Community; (2) provide
for a signicantly lower effective level of taxation, including zero taxation, than those levels that
generally apply in the Member State in question. The Code adds: Member States commit
themselves not to introduce new measures which are harmful within the meaning of this code,
and Member States commit themselves to re-examining their existing laws and established
practices (Council of the European Union, 1999, pp. 2-3). In short, the Code rules out
preferential tax measures.
A working group, chaired by the British paymaster general Dawn Primarolo, blacklisted 66
harmful tax practices in the European Union. Table 1.1 lists these practices. They include for
example the reduced corporate income tax rate for royalty income in France, the generous
provision for reinsurance companies in Luxembourg, and the reduced tax base for co-ordination
centers in Belgium. Other salient practices are the Dutch advance ruling on the applicability of
the participation exemption and the Irish ten percent corporate income tax rate for
manufacturing companies. The common denominator of these tax measures is their focus on
highly mobile business activity: a multinational can shift the holding of a patent right with its
corresponding inow of royalties relatively easily between subsidiaries; the same holds true for
reinsurance and other intra group services of co-ordination centers. This focus makes sense
from the perspective of an individual Member State: it can, by targeting its tax policy, engage in
tax competition without having to overhaul its entire tax system. The Code of Conduct intends to
curb this kind of competitive behavior.
Some Member States appear to compete more aggressively than others. The United Kingdom
accounts for as many as nineteen harmful tax practices, while Sweden goes scot-free. If one
excludes, however, overseas territories such as the British Virgin Islands, then the Netherlands
top the list with ten practices, followed by Ireland with ve. These numbers give only an
indication of a Member State's toughness in tax competition. The size of the capital ows
induced by these practices is more important. Nevertheless, as this size is unknown, the debate
concentrates on the numbers of practices. Therefore, the Netherlands and Ireland are under
considerable political pressure from their peers. They have to scrap, or at least to amend, their
harmful tax practices. There are signs that the Code is effective: the Netherlands brings its
advance rulings system under discussion, while Ireland discards its ten percent corporate
7Table 1.1 Harmful tax practices
i ii iii iv v vi total
Austria 2 2
Belgium 4 1 5
Denmark 1 1
Finland 1 1
France 1 1 2 4
Germany 1 1
Greece 1 1
Ireland 2 1 2 5
Italy 1 1
Luxembourg 2 1 1 1 5
The Netherlandsa 4 2 4 1 3 3 17
Portugalb 1 1
Spain 2 1 3
Sweden 0
The United Kingdomc 4 6 1 8 19
Total 15 10 13 7 12 9 66
i: nancial services to third parties, group nancing, royalty payments
ii: insurance, reinsurance, captive insurance
iii: intra group services
iv: holding companies
v: exempt and offshore companies
vi: miscellaneous
a including the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
b including Madeira and the Azores
c including Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey, the British Virgin islands, and the Isle of Man
8income tax rate for manufacturing companies. In both Member States there is, however,
downward pressure on the generic corporate income tax rate. In the Netherlands, the 'Van Rooy'
committee (Studiegroep vennootschapsbelasting in internationaal perspectief, 2001) advised the
government to reduce its rate from 35 to 30 percent, while Ireland is already committed to phase
down its rate from 24.5 to 12.5 percent.
The coincidence of these developments is most probably intentional. If the Code of Conduct
rules out preferential tax measures, then tax competition with the generic tax rate may become a
viable strategy. In that case the Code of Conduct may aggravate tax competition because it
extends the tax race to the bottom to all business activity. Tax jurists were among the rst to put
this idea forward (Ellis, 1999, 2000). Does it also stand up to formal economic reasoning? Keen
(2001), and Janeba and Smart (2001) put it to the test in models of tax competition and tax
coordination. Keen nds, under somewhat strict assumptions, that a Code of Conduct always
reduces tax revenue. Janeba and Smart nd, in a more general framework, that it does so under
certain conditions. Indeed, both papers lend support to the idea that the Code of Conduct may
set the cart before the horse. Two aspects remain to be settled. First, both Keen, and Janeba and
Smart directly relate tax bases to tax rates. This considerably simplies the structure of their
models. It does, however, obscure the economic behavior underlying these relations. Second,
since the relation between tax bases and tax rates lacks a micro foundation, it is impossible to
impute a government objective other than tax maximisation. This is consistent with the
Leviathan government that emerges from much of the public choice literature. It does, however,
beg the question why tax competition is a problem in the rst place. To put it differently, if
national governments are opportunistic tax maximisers, then why would a supra-national body
be interested in safeguarding their capacity to raise tax revenue? Therefore, to assume utility
maximisation comes naturally in the present context.
We address both aspects by featuring a representative agent. It allows us to simultaneously
provide the micro foundation and assume utility maximisation. We nd, in accordance with
Keen and Janeba and Smart, that the Code of Conduct may aggravate tax competition. Thus, our
analysis is to be interpreted as a strengthening of their ndings. We build the basic model in
chapter 2, establish an optimal taxation benchmark in chapter 3, and consider unconstrained tax
competition in chapter 4. We also nd underprovision of public goods. This provides the
rationale for intervention by a supra-national body such as the European Union. We consider
constrained tax maximisation in chapter 5. In particular, we model the Code of Conduct as an
additional restriction on the strategy space of individual governments: they must set equal tax
rates on distinct types of capital. We show in chapter 6 that this restriction reduces tax revenue
-and thus aggravates underprovision of public goods- if a certain condition is satised. It tells us
that a perverse outcome of this form of tax coordination is more likely to materialise if the upper
bound on non-distortionary taxes are high, if mobile capital is responsive to tax rate differentials,
and if the endowment of mobile capital is small. We explore a tax maximisation in chapter 7. It
9turns out that in such a world the Code of Conduct reduces tax revenue if and only if exactly the
same condition is satised. This shows that the result is robust to changes in government
behavior. It also shows that the results are comparable, albeit not exactly equal, to those of Keen
and Janeba and Smart. We conclude in chapter 8, and prove, nally, the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibria in the appendix.
102 The model
We assume a world of two identical countries. They each produce a homogeneous good, by
employing mobile and immobile capital. In addition, they each nance the provision of a
national public good by levying a source-based tax on either type capital. Since taxation involves a
positive externality -it drives mobile capital abroad, thereby increasing foreign tax bases- tax rates
tend to be too low from a world perspective.
2.1 Endowments and technology
Each resident country is endowed with one unit of immobile capital, and K units of mobile
capital. Immobile capital is to be supplied on the national capital market, whereas mobile capital
may be supplied anywhere. One should think of immobile capital as linked to normal business
activity, while mobile capital as linked to the highly mobile business activity that Member States
attempt to attract by their harmful tax practices. Since both countries are symmetrical, and since






k2 = K (2.1)
where ki denotes the amount of mobile capital per capita invested in country i, and the factors 1
2
refer to the relative size of either country.
Each type of capital is an imperfectly substitutable input for the production of homogeneous
national products. We follow Bucovetsky (1991) in assuming that the underlying technology can
be summarised by a quadratic production function
f (ki) = (a bki)ki (2.2)
where f(ki) denotes national product per capita in country i, and a and b are positive parameters.
This makes the model tractable while it preserves desired production function properties such as
concavity in inputs and continuous differentiability.
2.2 Capital markets
Capital arbitrage equalises net rates of return to mobile capital across countries. Furthermore,
perfect competition equalises these rates to the marginal productivity of mobile capital. Thus, the
capital market equilibrium is characterised by
r = a 2bki  ti (2.3)
where the 'interest rate' r denotes the net return to mobile capital, and ti the tax rate on the return
to mobile capital invested in country i.













We assume that a is large enough such that the interest rate is nonnegative, in and out of
equilibrium. In particular, we assume 1
a 4bK  1  0 (2.6)
Since immobile capital is a xed factor, its remuneration equals whatever remains of national
product after the return to mobile capital and taxes have been paid. Thus,
ri = bk2
i  ti (2.7)
where ri denotes the net rate of return to immobile capital in country i, and ti the corresponding
tax rate. One arrives at this expression by subtracting from the per capita national product f(ki),
the per capita return to mobile capital
¶ f(ki)










However crude, the model is capable of mimicking some important aspects of international
capital markets. First, equation (2.5) says that an increase in either tax rate decreases the interest
rate. This is of course a corollary of dening the interest rate as the net rate of return to mobile
capital. Second, equation (2.4) says increasing one's own tax rate drives mobile capital abroad.
Similarly, an increase of the other country's tax rate attracts mobile capital from abroad. The
backstop to these international capital movements are decreasing return to scale: a capital
exporting country experiences an increase of the gross rate of return; a capital importing country
experiences the reverse. This process continues until a capital market equilibrium will have been
established. The importance of decreasing returns to scale is reected by the fact that capital
ight, for a given change in tax rates, decreases in the parameter b. This parameter can therefore
be interpreted as the (reciprocal) responsiveness of mobile capital to tax rate differentials.
2.3 Public and private goods
Governments put tax revenue to use by producing public goods according to a 'one to one'
technology. This implies
gi = ti +tiki (2.9)
1 Note that the lowest possible interest rate materialises if all mobile capital is invested in a country that levies a 100
tax rate. Substituting ki = 2K and ti = 1, and imposing r  0 yields the inequality restriction. It also ensures that
investment will never be wasteful, i.e. that the economies will always be on the increasing part of the production
function.










Note that increasing the tax rate on internationally mobile capital leads to a less than proportional
increase (or even a decrease) in public good provision due to capital ight. Taxing immobile
capital is therefore more efcient.
Residents spend their net income on private goods, thus
xi = ri+rK (2.11)




















On a world scale private good consumption is simply total production minus public good
consumption. However, on a national scale this is not necessarily true. The reason is that
residents receive foreign source income, and that absentee capital must be paid. If a country is a
net exporter of mobile capital then private consumption exceeds the difference between national
product and public good consumption; similarly, if a country is a net importer the reverse holds
true. Which situation prevails depends of course on the constellation of tax rates on mobile
capital.
2.4 Preferences and the government objective
We follow Cremer and Gahvari (2000) in assuming that residents' preferences can be
summarised by a semi-log utility function
u(gi;xi) = xi+a lngi (2.13)
where a is a parameter between 0 and 1 that measures the preference for public relative to
private good consumption. This function allows us to derive a closed form solution while it
preserves a decreasing marginal rate of substitution.
Each government maximises the utility of its own residents. It does so by strategically setting
a pair of tax rates (ti;ti) such as to ensure an optimal mix of public and private goods. We
impose, however, a restriction on ti:
ti  t < a < t +tK (2.14)
The three constituent inequalities of the restriction have a natural interpretation: the rst
inequality ti  t says that there is an upper bound to the tax rate on immobile capital; the second
inequality t < a ensures that this upper bound is low enough to force governments to raise at
13least some revenue by taxing mobile capital, and thus to engage in tax competition; the third
inequality a < t +tK implies, nally, that the preference for public goods is not so strong that
governments cannot raise sufcient revenue to nance the desired amount of public goods, even
if they tax both types of capital maximally.
143 The global optimum
Before delving into tax competition and the Code of Conduct, it is useful to look at optimal
taxation. This provides a benchmark by which to measure taxation under two distinct regimes:
one in which both governments are unconstrained in setting their tax rates, of course within the
confounds of restriction (2.14), and another in which they are subject to the Code of Conduct that
rules out harmful tax practices. We arrive at the following result:
Proposition 1 Any set of tax rates that satises gi = a and ti = tj maximises global welfare, dened as
the sum of the utilities of the residents of both countries.
Proof. The maximisation problem of a benevolent supranational body with the discretion to set


















j = 0 vi = ti;ti; i = 1;2

















































1 The second order condition will also be satised (see the appendix).
15The result can be understood as follows: equality of tax rates on mobile capital ensures, by
equation (2.4), that neither country is a net capital importer or exporter. This implies that world
production is at its maximum. Furthermore, optimal public good provision should depend on
the preference for public goods. The condition here is particularly simple: optimal public good
provision equals the preference parameter a. Thus, both total production and the mix of public
and private goods are optimal. Effectively, the supranational body sets world-wide tax on mobile
capital that acts like an efcient lump sum tax since the overall supply of capital is exogenously
xed.
164 Laissez faire
We rst consider a 'laissez faire' regime in which governments are unconstrained in setting tax
rates on mobile and immobile capital. This regime likens the European situation before the
adoption of the Code of Conduct: apart from a few directives on international double taxation of
dividends and royalties, there was no tax coordination in that era. We nd
Proposition 2 The Nash equilibrium tax rates equal t l
i = t and tl
i =
4bK(a t)
4bK2+a where the index l refers
to the laissez faire regime. The tax rate on mobile capital is relatively low since tl
i < tl
i , and there is
underprovision of public goods as gl
i < a.









ti  t (i)
ti  1 (ii)
In order to avoid notational clutter we have omitted the index l. The interesting regime is when




i  t +rK+aln(t +tiki)
where we omit constraint (ii) and verify ex post that it holds. The rst order condition with


























The smallest possible difference t  tl
i is, by the fact that tl











as well as that constraint (ii) holds. The Nash equilibrium public good provision equals
gl
i = t +
4bK2(a  t)
4bK2+a
17Finally, inequality (2.14) implies
gl
i < a
The intuition behind the result is that governments set the highest possible tax rate on
immobile capital. They do this to minimise the excess burden of taxation, i.e. to minimise capital
ight. Nevertheless, the demand for public goods, in conjunction with the upper bound on
non-distortionary taxes, forces governments to tax mobile capital. Tax competition prompts
them, however, to set tax rates that are relatively low. Note that this qualies as a harmful tax
practice as dened by the Code of Conduct working group: the lower tax rate both may affect the
location of business activity, and provides for a lower level of taxation than those levels that
generally apply. The stronger is the preference for public goods, the more governments are
inclined to set a high tax rate on mobile capital, ceteris paribus. Unfortunately, the higher tax rate
never catches up with the stronger preference: there always will be underprovision of public
goods. This is, of course, in line with the main nding from the tax competition literature1.
1 For a survey of this literature see Wilson (1999).
185 Primarolo
In this chapter we consider a regime in which the strategy space of individual governments is
constrained. In particular, within their own country they must set the same tax rate on mobile
and immobile capital; between countries tax rates may differ. Thus
ti = ti (5.1)
This constraint captures the thrust of the Code of Conduct which rules out preferential regimes
but leaves national sovereignty in tax matters untouched. For this reason we dub this regime
'Primarolo', after the chairwoman of the Code of Conduct working group. We arrive at the
following result:




2+a where the index p refers to the




i and implies underprovision of public goods as the inequality gp
i < a remains to
hold true.
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> > > > :
ti  t (i)
ti  1 (ii)
ti = ti (iii)
We solve the problem by substituting constraint (iii) in the maximand 1. We verify ex post that
constraints (i) and (ii) hold. The rst order condition, to be interpreted as the best response




















Imposing symmetry gives the Nash equilibrium tax rate
tp





Since 0 < a < 1 it is true that
4b(K+1)a < 4b(K+1)  4b(K+1)
2 < 4b(K+1)
2+a






1 This is harmless since there are no cross terms between ti and ti.





















Since constraint (i) is not binding we know that
4b(K+1)((K+1)t  a) >  at
This in turn implies that
tp
i  tl
i  a (a  t)+aKt













dividing by a reveals that
gp
i < a
We suggested in the introduction that the Code of Conduct has two opposing effects: it
alleviates underprovision of public goods because it prompts governments to raise tax rates on
mobile capital; it also aggravates, however, underprovision because it prompts governments to
lower tax rates on immobile capital. The result shows that both effects are present: the Nash
equilibrium tax rate under the Primarolo regime lies in between the tax rates on mobile and
immobile capital under the laissez faire regime. Since the Code of Conduct never entirely solves
underprovision of public goods remains it remains a second best form of tax coordination.
206 When does the Code of Conduct fail?
One cannot be certain about whether the Code of Conduct aggravates or alleviates
underprovision of public goods. Either outcome may prevail, depending on whether the
downward pressure on the tax rate on immobile capital, or the upward pressure on the tax rate
on mobile capital dominates. The model does allow the derivation of a condition that constitutes
the borderline between failure and success. We nd:
Proposition 4 The Code of Conduct aggravates underprovision of public goods if the negative effect on
government revenue of a lower tax on immobile capital outweighs the positive effect of a higher tax rate
on mobile capital. A sufcient condition for this to hold true is 4b(2K+1) t  0
Proof. In equilibrium all capital is invested, and there is no net capital import or export. Thus
private good consumption equals






i < 0 () gp
i  gl
i < 0
In other words, the Code of Conduct decreases utility if and only if it decreases revenue and thus

















where A = 4b(K+1)
2+a and B = 4bK2+a. Since A and B are strictly positive, public good
provision decreases if the nominator is negative. This holds true if
A(a  t) Ba < 0
where we have used the notion that 4b(K+1)
2 = A Ba and B 4bK2 = a to simplify the
expression. Substituting A and B yields
a(4b(2K+1) t) t4b(K+1)
2 < 0
21The second term on the left hand side is strictly negative. Thus for the inequality to hold it is
sufcient that
4b(2K +1) t  0
The result reveals that the likelihood of a perverse outcome of the Code of Conduct depends
on political institutions that determine the upper bound on the tax rate on immobile capital t,
the (reciprocal) responsiveness of mobile capital to tax rate differentials b, and the endowment of
mobile capital K. The intuition behind the result is not immediately obvious. Why would, for
example, a relatively high upper bound on the tax rate on immobile capital (a high t) increase the
likelihood of failure?
The answer is that the bulk of the public goods can be nanced by nondistortionary taxes on
mobile capital, a state of affairs that comes close to rst best taxation. The Code of Conduct,
which is only second best, is then more likely to aggravate underprovision of public goods.
A high responsiveness of mobile capital to tax rate differentials (a low b) also increases the
likelihood of failure. At rst glance it seems it should work in the opposite direction. After all, it
makes tax competition for mobile capital erce, suggesting a potentially positive role for a Code
of Conduct. Note, however, that a high responsiveness also undermines the benet of a Code of
Conduct: just as it prompts governments to set low tax rates on mobile capital in the laissez faire
regime, it prompts governments to set a low generic tax rate under the Primarolo regime. What
the condition tells us is that the loss of tax revenue under the latter regime is larger.
Finally, a low endowment of mobile capital (a low K) also makes failure more likely.
Admittedly, a small 'mass' of mobile capital implies that the corresponding tax rate is volatile. It
seems, therefore, that the Code of Conduct should be successful in raising it. A low K would then
make failure less, rather than more likely. The ip side of the coin is, however, that a small mass
of mobile capital implies that even a large increase of the corresponding tax rate has only a small
impact on tax revenue. The condition tells us is that the narrowness of the tax base is more
important than the volatility of the tax rate.
In short, a consistent policy maker cannot believe that the business activities to which
harmful tax practices correspond are highly mobile, or constitute an insignicant part of the
economy, and simultaneously support of the Code of Conduct.
227 A different government objective
In this chapter we assume that governments maximise tax revenue. This allows us to check
whether the results are sensitive to changes in government behavior as well as to make a better
comparison with the results of Keen (2001) and Janeba and Smart (2001). By ignoring the terms
referring to xi in the objective functions we arrive at the equilibrium tax rates under the laissez
faire and Primarolo regimes: tl
i = 4bK and tp
i = 4b(K+1). The corresponding tax revenues equal
gl
i = 4bK2 +t and gp
i = 4b(K+1)
2, and the increase in tax revenue is gp
i  gl
i = 4b(2K+1) t.
Thus, the condition for the Code of Conduct to aggravate tax competition is
4b(2K +1) t  0 (7.1)
This condition is identical to the one we obtained under utility maximisation. Here it is,
however, necessary and sufcient whereas before it was sufcient but not necessary, hence
Proposition 5 If the Code of Conduct alleviates tax competition under utility maximisation, then it
also does so under tax maximisation. The reverse is, however, not necessarily true.
In short, the impact of the Code of Conduct is similar under both types of government
behavior: it aggravates tax competition under exactly the same condition on the model
parameters. This constitutes a slight departure from Keen (2001). He nds that the Code of
Conduct always aggravates tax competition. It seems more in accordance with Janeba and Smart
(2001): they nd, just as we do, that it only does so under certain conditions. The conditionality
in their model depends, however, on the endogenousness of the total supply of capital. In any
event, the message that their papers as well as ours bring across is that there are good reasons to
doubt the Code of Conduct helps to solve tax competition.
238 Conclusion
The Code of Conduct working group appears to evade the dilemma of tax coordination versus
national sovereignty. It restricts preferential tax measures for internationally footloose business
activity, while it allows governments to decide upon their generic tax systems. Unfortunately,
there is no guarantee that the Code alleviates tax competition. In fact, it may put the cart before
the horse by prompting governments to compete with their generic tax rates.
This suggests that the dilemma is inevitable: curbing tax competition requires the sacrice of
sovereignty. In particular, this suggests that safeguarding tax revenue requires that the EU
should look more closely into further reaching forms of tax coordination instead of pressing on
with the recommendations of the Code of Conduct working group. We do not wish, however, to
stress this conclusion as there are a few caveats.
The rst is related to one's view of the government. It may, contrary to what the model
presupposes, fail to maximise the utility of their residents, for example because it is interested in
tax revenue for its own sake, or because it allows slack in the provision of public goods. In that
case tax competition fullls the useful purpose of disciplining the government. Clearly, the
conclusion above can then not be drawn. Among political scientists and economists there is,
however, no consensus on the nature of the government. Thus, for the time being one's view
remains the result of personal opinion and political convictions about which we have little to say.
The second caveat has to do with the focus of the model. In line with the policy debate it
highlights the impact of tax competition and tax coordination on tax revenue. This implies,
however, that important issues, such as the impact of tax competition and tax coordination on the
allocation of capital over countries and industries, or the impact on the accumulation of capital
and growth, disappear from sight. This focus is necessary: without it the model would become
intractable. Nevertheless, it does imply that the results are of partial nature: they only highlight
one aspect of the problem.
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which implies that Hessian matrix of the objective function is negative denite and thus that the
second order condition for a maximum are satised.



























These conditions, in conjunction with the continuity concavity of the objective functions
ensure the existence and uniqueness of the equilibria under the different regimes.
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